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The equity market value can be seen as a call option on the firm’s asset.   The exercise price is the debt face value.  We built 
a sample composed by the most traded stocks of Brazilian companies rated by Moody’s or Standard& Poor’s and estimated 
for each stock  the default probability reflected on price using the Option Theory Model.  We compared the estimated 
probability with the historical mortality rate published by Moody’s and assigned each company a credit rating. We than 
compared the assigned rating to the agencies’ domestic rating and concluded that in general both ratings are in accordance.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
“Credit Monitor”, a dynamic financial service that discloses default probability estimated by Option Theory Model (OTM), 
has been the lead product of KMV since 1993.  KMV is a credit risk software house that belongs to Moody’s.  McQuown 
(1993) has analyzed more than two thousands US industrial companies that were liquidated or went default during the last 
20 years.  In all cases, he observed that the default probability estimated by OTM increased drastically one or two years 
before the default event occurred.  The shift in the OTM default probability anticipated one year or  even  more  the 
downgrade in the Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s credit ratings. 
 
Our objective is to estimate default probabilities of Brazilian public companies through the OTM and analyze if the results 
are adequate.  We did so by comparing OTM results with Standard&Poor’s and Moody’s credit ratings in domestic 
currency.    The investigation whether Option Theory estimates better ratings than accounting ratings, as suggested by 
McQuown (1993)  is beyond the scope of  this paper.   For nine out of fifteen companies we estimated the same credit rating 
assigned by the agencies (at the level of the big letter).  In only one company we observed OTM rating lower than the 
agencies’ rating.  In five companies we observed OTM ratings superior than the agencies’ ratings, but only for Vale do Rio 
Doce, Petrobras and CEMIG the divergence was severe. 
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We structured the paper as following.  In section II we explain and define credit rating; in section III we explain how to 
apply Option Theory to estimate default probability; in section IV we describe the sample and present the results and in 
section V we conclude the paper. 
 
 
II.  Credit Ratings  
 
The two biggest credit risk agencies are Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.  According to Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000), 
their market position was dominant in such an extension that the US Justice Department inquiries have investigated whether 
there were anticompetitive practices in the bond rating industry.    The following agencies in terms of reputation and size are 
Duff & Phelps and Fitch.  Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s rate issues and issuers, and anyone can have free access to their 
opinion.  Their credit ratings are strongly correlated to interest rates. 
 
A credit rating is not a recommendation to invest in a certain issuer or issue.  Standard & Poor’s (2003) defines issue credit 
rating as a current opinion about the credit quality of a certain issuer relative to a specific financial obligation, or to a 
specific class of financial obligations, or to a specific financial program.    It takes into account the creditworthiness of the 
guarantors, insurers and any other forms of credit enhancement on the obligation. 
 
Standard & Poor’s (2003) defines issuer’s credit rating as a current opinion of an obligor’s overall financial capacity to pay 
its financial obligations.  This opinion is based on the obligor’s capacity and willingness to meet its financial obligations as 
they come due.  It does not apply to any specific obligation, because it does not consider the nature and provisions of a 
specific obligation and neither the creditworthiness of the guarantors and insurers.  Corporate issuer credit rating applies 
when the issuer is a company and sovereign credit rating applies when the issuer is a country. 
 
Credit ratings are based on current information furnished by obligors or obtained from other sources that  the agencies 
consider reliable.  They may be changed, suspended or withdrawn as a result of changes in, or unavailability of such 
information. 
 
The credit risk analysis considers also the country risk.  The currency the payments are denominated is a key factor in this 
analysis.  Financial obligations denominated in local currency have a higher probability of payment than obligations   2 
denominated in foreign currency.  This is due to the fact that if the obligor’s country defaults, the Central Bank can retain all 
capital flows that would exit the country.  Even though the obligor has a good credit quality and is willing to pay its foreign 
debt, it can be impeded of doing so by the Government, in country’s default event.   Sovereign credit risk is  incorporated in 
issue’s and issuer’s credit ratings.  Credit rating in domestic currency  may be different than the credit rating in foreign 
currency for the same obligor. 
 
Usually issuer credit rating in foreign currency is upward bounded by the sovereign credit r ating.  Issue credit rating in 
foreign currency is not necessarily  subject to the sovereign rating roof, because the obligation may enclose collaterals, 
insurance and other protections that guarantee its payments even in the event of a country default. 
 
Table I  contains a description of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s rating grades.   According to Altman, C aouette.  and 
Narayanan(1998), Standard&Poor’s assigns grades based on business risk (industry characteristics, competitive position, 
management) and financial risk ( financial characteristics, financial policies,  profitability, capital structure, cash flow 
protection, financial flexibility).  Industry risk (the industry competitive position and stability) is the factor that deserves 
more weight in the rating decision.  Moody’s focuses also on business fundamentals, as the nature of supply and demand, 
market leadership and cost positions.  In analyzing financial risk, Standard&Poor’s estimates a number of financial rations 
(interest coverage, leverage and cash flow) and track their evolution along the time.  Although there are divergences, most 
times  Standard&Poor’s and Moody’s grades are coincident, at least at the level of the big letter.    The historical default 
rates by grades of both agencies are pretty similar too. 
 
Table II shows the historical cumulative default rates by rating grades at the level of the big letter (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, 
CCC) published by Moody’s (2004).  Table III exhibits the cumulative default rates by gradations of the big letter, and was 
built from the migration matrix published by Moody’s (2004).  We can observe that default rates are negative correlated to 
rating quality and increases significantly for the speculative grades.   
 
The financial market corroborates the rating agencies’ opinions.  Table IV shows data collected from Altman, Caouette and 
Narayanan (1998).  We can observe that the interest rate or yield required by an investor is inversely proportional to the 
obligation’s rating quality.  The poorest is the rating quality, the higher is the required yield.   
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In Table V we can see the rating grades assigned to Brazilian companies published by Standard&Poor’s and Moody’s.  
Standard&Poor’s publishes ratings in foreign and domestic currencies and Brazil.  Moody’s publishes ratings in foreign and 
domestic currencies.  As we can note, the rating grades in foreign currency are always lower than the grades in domestic 
currency.  This is due to Brazilian sovereign risk.  The impact in the cost of debt of Brazilian Companies is substantial.  
Bloomberg builds indexes of  American industrial corporate bonds by Standard& Poor’s rating grades.  Table VI shows 
yield curves of rating grade indexes at November 1
st 2005.  S&P graded Aracruz and Votorantim a BB- as foreign currency 
and AAA as Brazil rating.  Using Table VI data, we can estimate roughly an increase of 2.12% in the interest rate of a 10 
year financial obligation.  Banco Itaú, CSM and Klabin were graded a BB- in foreign currency and AA in local currency.  
The same analyzes estimates roughly an increase of 2.06% in the 10 year fixed income interest rates. Petrobras was rated 
BBB+ in domestic currency, and downgraded to B- at foreign currency, meaning a 1.95% increase in interest rate. 
 
 
III. The Use of Option Theory to Estimate Default Probability 
 
Credit risk structural models  assume that a company goes bankrupt when its asset market value (A) falls bellow the face 
value of its debt  (B).  Some academic examples can be found at Wilcox (1973),  Scott (1981) and Santomero and Vinso 
(1977).  The fundamental idea was first proposed by Merton (1974) in his Firm Theory.  According to the Firm Theory, the 
equity market value can be priced as a call option with  the underlying asset being the asset market value (A) and the 
exercise price being the face  value of debt (B).  
 
If the company has shares traded in the stock market, it is possible to observe the equity market value, the stock return 
volatility and the debt book value.  If we assume that the asset value behaves according to a Geometric Brownian motion 
with a constant mean r, a constant standard deviation sA , and a lognormal distribution, it is possible to estimate the asset 
value through the Black & Scholes (1973) equation:   
 
E = AN(h1) - Be
-rtN(h2)                      (1) 
h1 = (ln(A/B) + (r+sA
2/2)t)/(s A(t)
1/2) 
h2 = h1 -sA(t)
1/2 
    
where:   4 
 
E  = equity market value (call option value) 
A = asset market value 
B = face value of debt 
r    = continuously compounded risk free return rate 
sA = standard deviation of asset return rates 
N(.)= standard cumulative normal distribution  
 
We can observe the standard deviation of equity returns, but not of asset returns.  But the following expression relates 
asset’s volatility to equity’s volatility: 
 
sE = (A (dE/dA))/E * sA                     (2) 
 
With two equations (Black and Scholes and the relation between asset and equity volatilities)  we can conduct an iterative 
process to estimate the two unknowns:  asset current value and asset return volatility.  The asset value distribution in 
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Where Zt= N (0, 1) and m is the instantaneous asset return rate.  The asset expected value at moment t is equal to A0e
mt. 
 
If we assume that the firm’s capital structure is composed only by equity and one zero coupon bond due in T years, with 
face value of B, the default can occur only if the asset value falls bellow B at debt maturity.  
 
This model was commercialized by KMV, a credit risk software house that today belongs to Moody’s.  The model generates 
an EDF (estimated default frequency) for each company monitored by KMV.  The EDF is calibrated to measure default 
probability in a one-year horizon.  KMV defines default as the event of nonpaying   interest installment, principal or any 
other financial commitment as they come due.  The default event is different than the bankruptcy event.  It occurs before the 
firm goes bankrupt, and therefore before the asset value falls bellow B.  KMV assumes that a company enters default when   5 
its asset value falls bellow the default point (DPT), and arbitrarily calculates it as the value of the short term debt plus half 
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Where STD is the book value of short term debt and LTD is the book value of long term debt. 
  
The default distance (DD) equals how many times the distance between the asset expected value at T and the default point is 
greater than the asset return standard deviation. 
 
DD= (E (At)-DPT)/sA                          (5) 
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Where A0 is the asset current value,  DPT is the default point in T years, m is the after tax asset return and sA is the asset 
return volatility. 
 
EDF equals to the probability that the asset value is bellow B. 
 
EDF = Probability (z<-DD)                (7) 
 
According to McQuown (1993),  models based on market information are superior than models based on accounting 
information, because prices are ex-ante information continuously reviewed while accounting information reflect past, and 
are at best quarterly reviewed.  Bader and Sanvicente (1996)  observed that stock prices of companies that went to 
concordata (the Brazilian process that corresponds to Chapter 11) presented negative cumulative abnormal returns three 
years and in some cases five years before the concordata event.  
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IV. Methodology and Results  
 
We estimated default probabilities using Option Theory for all Brazilian companies listed on Table V (graded by Moody’s 
and/ or S&P). 
 
IV.1. Estimation of Default Probability using Option Theory 
 
Initially we estimated asset value per share and asset volatility for each sample company using equations (1) and (2).  We 
collected all required market and accounting information at Economatica (a Brazilian database).  The equity market value 
per share (E) equals the closing price per share at December 2004 of the most traded company’s stock. We calculated the 
default point (DPT) as the short term debt book value per share plus half of the long term debt book value per share at 
December 2004, as suggested in equation (4).  We used consolidated financial statements.  We also collected historical 
series of monthly closing prices of the sample stocks from December 1999 till December 2004 in order to generate equity 
historical return series as follows. 
 
Rit= ln(Pit/P i,t-1)                    (8) 
Where : 
Rit = stock i return at month t 
Ln(.) = natural logarithm  
Pit = stock i price at month t 
Pi,t-1 = stock i price at month t-1 
 
The equity volatility (se) was calculated as the standard deviation of the equity return time series. 
 
We conducted an iterative process in three steps to calculate the asset value (A) and return volatility (sA).  In the first step 
we calculate the asset value per share that solves equation (1).  In the second step we calculate the asset volatility that solves 
equation (2).  In the third step we substitute the asset volatility calculated in step 2 and run again steps 1 through 3.  We stop 
when the round n asset volatility calculated in step 2 equals the asset volatility in round n-1. 
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After estimating asset value and asset return volatility, we estimate the default probability (EDF) using equations (6) and 




The asset instantaneous return rate corresponds to the weighted average of expected equity return in one year and expected 
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Where: 
Ei= equity market value of company i 
Ai= asset market value of company i 
kei = instantaneous equity expected return rate of company i 
Bi = debt market value of company i 
kd= instantaneous debt expected return rate of company i  
 
The equity expected return was estimated by the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965), and Mossin (1966). 
  
kei = r f+bi*(E(rm) – rf)                  (10) 
 
Where: 
kei = equilibrium expected equity return 
rf = risk free asset rate of return 
bi= beta coefficient of stock i, that measures the sensibility of the company i’s stock returns to market portfolio returns. 
E(rm)= market portfolio expected return 
 
We used the Brazilian saving account as a proxy for the risk free asset.  Its interest rate at December 31
st 2004 was  9.27% 
per year  
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The equity beta of each company stock was estimated as follows. 
 
Ri,t= ai + bi*Rm,t + ei,t                  (11) 
 
Where: 
Ri,t = historical stock i return time serie from December 1999 till December 2004 
ai = constant for stock i equation estimated by Ordinary Least Square regression model 
bi = equity beta coefficient for company i estimated by the OLS regression model 
Rm, t= IBOVESPA return time series from December 1999 till December 2004 
ei,t = regression’s error term series 
 
We adopted the methodology suggested by Minardi and Sanvicente (2003) to estimate the market expected portfolio return 
used in the CAPM.  Under the assumption that dividends growth at a constant rate (g), the equity intrinsic value (V 0) is 








0                      (12) 
 
where D1 is the dividend to be paid in the beginning of period 1 and ke is the equity equilibrium expected rate of return. 
  
If the market is efficient, the equity intrinsic value equals the market equity value.  Then, it is possible to estimate the equity 
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The market portfolio rate of return was estimated as the equal weighted average of all available stock returns.  Assuming 
that D1= D0*(1+g), we can estimate the expected market portfolio return as: 
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Minardi and Sanvicente (2003)  modeled the dividend growth rate as the growth rate the company can sustain in the long 
term keeping the same capital structure and the same dividend police.  
 
g = ROE · b                  (15) 
 
Where ROE is the return on equity and b is the plowback ratio.  The plowback ratio equals  1 – dividend payout ratio. 
 
In order to estimate the market portfolio expected rate of return we collected closing price at December 2004 of all public 
companies’ most traded stock, dividend per share in December 2004 and estimated growing rates for 2002, 2003 and 2004 
using the corresponding earning per share and ROE of each company.  We dropped all companies that did not have shares 
traded in December 2004, presented accounting losses and negative ROE in any of the year 2002, 2003 and 2004.  We used 
the 2002, 2003 and 2004 average growing rate.   The final sample was composed by 90 companies and the E (rm) was 
estimated in 16.60% per year. 
 
We do not observe the instantaneous debt expected rate of return.  If the company faces financial distress, this rate can be 
very close to zero or even negative, because debtholders do not expect that their investment position will increase in value.  
Besides, whenever there is a financial distress situation, debt weight in capital structure is higher than equity weight. 
 
As the instantaneous expected asset return rate (m) corresponds to the weighted average between equity and debt expected 
return rates, its value range from zero and ke. So, we estimated two bound values for the EDF.  For the superior limit, that is, 
the pessimistic or worst scenario, we considered that asset value return rate for the one-year horizon is zero.  For the inferior 
limit, that is, the optimistic or best scenario, we considered that the asset value return in the one-year horizon will equal ke. 
  
Table  VII presents the required data, the default probabilities estimated if asset return equals ke ( best scenario) or zero 
(worst scenario).   
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It is interesting to point that in all cases where the default point per share was much inferior to the stock price the 
convergence was very fast:  two or three rounds. We had to run much more rounds in the cases where the default point per 
share was superior to the stock price. 
 
We could not estimate EDF for commercial banks, Eletrobras and All America because of missing required data. 
  
IV.2. Credit Rating Assignment and Result evaluation 
 
We compared the estimated default probabilities (EDF) with the historical mortality rates for one-year horizon published by 
Moody’s (Tables II and III) and assigned credit ratings at the level of the big letter.  
 
Table VIII shows the assigned rating based on EDF for the best case and worst case scenarios, Moody’s credit ratings in 
domestic currency and S&P credit rating Brazil.  We used ratings with domestic currency to exclude Brazil country risk 
effect.   
 
Consider Table VIII and compare columns 3 and 4 (S&P) or 5 and 6 (Moody’s).  There is no difference in assigned credit 
ratings in the best and worst scenarios for 12 out of 18 companies.  There are three companies graded CCC or Caa in the 
worst scenario and a higher grades in the best scenario:  Centrais Elétricas Paulista – CESP, Centrais Eléricas do Espírito 
Santo – Escelsa and Net Serviços de Comunicação.  CESP was graded CCC by S&P, Escelsa was graded B2 in foreign 
currency but was not rated in domestic currency and Net was graded D by S&P.  
   
Compare now column 1 (S&P Brazil) with columns 3 and 4 (best and worst scenarios - S&P) or column and 2 (Moody’s 
domestic) with columns 5 and 6 (best and worst scenarios - Moody’s).  Although we could calculate EDF for 18 companies, 
we can compare only 15 of them.  Although Escelsa, Cia. Brasileira de Petroleo Ipiranga and Sadia, were graded in foreign 
rating  by one of the two agencies, they  were not graded either in rating Brazil by S&P neither by domestic rating by 
Moody’s.  For nine companies, assigned ratings are coincident with the agencies.  For five companies, the assigned ratings 
were better than the agencies’ ratings.  The difference of grades for Klabin (AA- by S&P versus AAA by OTM) and 
Usiminas (A+ by S&P versus AA by OTM) was not very high, since they were rated by the agencies one grade bellow the 
OTM estimated rating.  It is not the case for Petrobrás (BBB by S&P versus AAA by OTM), Cia. Vale do Rio Doce (Baa2 
by Moody’s and AAA by OTM) and CEMIG (B1 by Moody’s and AAA by OTM).  We can observe that Moody’s domestic   11 
rating is usually lower than S&P Brazil rating (assigned by the local S&P team).  There was only one company where the 
assigned OTM rating was worst than the agency’s:  Cosipa (A+ by S&P versus BBB by OTM).  But this divergence is not 
very severe, because it is for neighbors’ grade investment ratings.   12 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Option Theory can be used to estimate default probabilities of companies with shares traded in stock exchanges.  The results 
in the Brazilian sample were very reasonable and generally  coincident with the agencies’ opinion.  Vale do Rio Doce, 
Petrobrás and CEMIG  were the biggest divergences.  Vale do Rio Doce and Petrobrás have a very strong weight in the 
Brazilian Economy, and the fact that the stock prices reflect a AAA rating seems reasonable.  The agencies’ rating can 
reflect though political factors considered relevant for external analysts, but not for Brazilian equity market analysts.  The 
divergence of ratings for CEMIG seems to be more severe, but the comparison was made with Moody’s rating in domestic 
currency, that usually is lower than S&P rating Brazil. 
 
One difficulty in estimating EDF is the instantaneous asset rate of return, because we cannot observe it.  The use of worst 
and best scenario is one way of dealing with the problem.  In most divergences, the worst scenario assigned rating was 
closest to the agencies’ ratings.  This may reflect the conservative position of credit analysts.   
 
Brazilian sovereign risk has a substantial impact in debt interest rate.  For the cases we analyzed, it represented an average 
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Table I – Issuer Credit Ratings  




Moody’s  Interpretation  S&P and 
other 
agencies 
Moody’s  Interpretation 
AAA  Aaa  The highest  credit quality.  
Extremely strong capacity to 







The least degree of speculation.  
Probably  obligor will meet 
financial obligations, but faces 
major ongoing uncertainties or 
exposure to adverse business, 








Very strong capacity to meet 








Currently has the capacity to 
meet financial commitment, but 
adverse conditions will likely 
impair the obligor’s capacity to 







More susceptible to the 
adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic 
conditions, but still strong 
capacity to meet financial 









Obligor is currently vulnerable 
to nonpayment and its solvency 
is dependent upon favorable 
conditions.  In the event of 
adverse conditions, the obligor 








Adequate capacity to meet 
financial commitments., but 
adverse  conditions or 
changing circumstances are 




Ca  Reserved to “income bonds” in 
the event of nonpayment.  
      D    Default 
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Table II. Historical Cumulative Default Rate per Rating Grade (1970-2004) – Issuer weighted statistics 
 
Moody's Years after issuance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aaa 0 0 0 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.3 0.41 0.52 0.63
Aa 0 0 0.03 0.12 0.2 0.29 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.61
A 0.02 0.08 0.22 0.36 0.5 0.67 0.85 1.04 1.25 1.48
Baa 0.19 0.54 0.98 1.55 2.08 2.59 3.12 3.65 4.25 4.89
Ba 1.22 3.34 5.79 8.27 10.72 12.98 14.81 16.64 18.4 20.11
B 5.81 12.93 19.51 25.33 30.48 35.1 39.45 42.89 45.89 48.64
Caa-C 22.43 35.96 46.71 54.19 59.72 64.49 68.06 71.91 74.53 76.77  
source:  Moody’s 
 
 
Table III.  Cumulative Default Rate per Rating Grade (1970-2003) – Issuer weighted statistics 
 
Moody's Years after issuance
1 2 3 4 5
Aaa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.20%
Aa1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.27%
Aa2 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.15% 0.33%
Aa3 0.07% 0.10% 0.19% 0.29% 0.42%
A1 0.00% 0.03% 0.32% 0.52% 0.68%
A2 0.02% 0.06% 0.21% 0.43% 0.59%
A3 0.02% 0.21% 0.34% 0.41% 0.49%
Baa1 0.12% 0.42% 0.71% 0.97% 1.19%
Baa2 0.10% 0.34% 0.56% 1.07% 1.53%
Baa3 0.46% 1.09% 1.61% 2.38% 3.00%
Ba1 0.69% 2.00% 3.23% 4.65% 5.84%
Ba2 0.67% 2.35% 4.45% 6.36% 7.85%
Ba3 2.19% 5.49% 9.13% 12.47% 15.38%
B1 3.46% 8.93% 13.90% 17.65% 20.67%
B2 7.65% 14.29% 20.35% 23.61% 25.91%
B3 11.86% 20.17% 26.13% 29.66% 32.19%
Caa-C 26.05% 33.72% 37.98% 41.09% 42.48%  
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Table IV.  Corporate Bond Credit Spread over US T-Bond 30 years 
Year                                          Ratings
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
1980 0.60 1.00 1.30 1.90 3.00 3.80
1981 0.60 1.10 1.30 2.20 3.40 4.10
1982 0.60 1.00 1.40 2.60 3.60 4.90 9.20
1983 0.70 0.75 0.90 1.57 2.70 3.60 7.60
1984 0.55 0.73 1.04 1.75 2.80 3.10 5.60
1985 0.20 0.58 1.65 1.46 3.10 4.00 6.20
1986 0.95 1.59 1.70 2.33 3.70 4.70 7.90
1987 0.58 1.02 1.18 1.82 2.43 4.03 7.23
1988 0.42 0.79 1.29 1.75 2.07 3.12 7.22
1989 1.28 1.61 2.08 2.49 3.76 4.95 11.91
1990 1.02 1.34 1.77 2.52 4.78 8.57 23.65
1991 0.82 1.13 1.61 2.71 3.92 8.93 12.95
1992 0.90 1.08 1.54 1.77 3.29 4.34 6.46
1993 0.70 0.76 1.74 1.96 2.82 4.15 6.15
1994 0.29 0.62 1.01 1.37 2.23 3.12 6.38
1995 0.43 0.60 1.17 1.49 2.45 4.25 8.75
1996 0.25 0.35 0.54 0.88 2.00 4.08 8.43
1997 0.28 0.39 0.57 0.83 1.53 3.30 7.29  
source: Altman, Cauotte and Narayana (1998) 
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Table V.  Credit Rating of Brazilian Corporate Issuers 
Company Standard& Poor's Moody's
Foreign Domestic Brazil Foreign Domestic
Currency Currency Currency Currency
All America BBB+
Ambev BBB AAA B1 Baa3
Aracruz Celulose S.A. BB- BBB- AAA Baa3
Banco Bradesco S.A. BB B2
Banco Itau S.A. BB- BB AA B2
Brasil Telecom S.A. AA+ Baa3
Braskem S.A. BB- BB AA-
Cia Energética de Minas Gerais - CEMIG B1
Centrais Elétricas Paulista - CESP CCC
Cia Paranaense de Energia - COPEL
Cia Siderurgica Nacional - CSN BB- BB AA- B1
Cia Siderúrgica Paulista - Cosipa BB- A+ B1
Eletrobrás BB- BB
Embratel S.A. B1
Centrais Elétricas do Espírito Santo - Escelsa B2
Gerdau S.A. AA-
Cia. Brasileira de Petróleo Ipiranga B1
Klabin S.A. BB- BB AA-
Net Serviços de Comunicação S.A. D Ca
Petrobrás S.A. B- BBB+ B1 Baa1
Sadia S.A. BB- BB
Unibanco S.A. BB- BB B2
Usiminas BB- BB A+ B2
Cia Vale do Rio Doce Ba1 Baa2
Votorantim S.A. BB- BBB- AAA  
Table VI – Yields according to rating grades and maturity 
Yields
Maturity US  US Ind. US Ind. US Ind. US Ind. US Ind. US Ind.
years T-Strip AAA AA A BBB BB B
0.25 3.91% 4.26% 4.36% 4.49% 4.82% 5.30% 5.91%
0.5 4.26% 4.39% 4.50% 4.60% 4.91% 5.33% 6.08%
1 4.36% 4.69% 4.70% 4.77% 5.02% 5.44% 6.40%
2 4.36% 4.71% 4.74% 4.86% 5.12% 5.81% 6.75%
3 4.43% 4.72% 4.76% 4.87% 5.25% 6.16% 7.09%
4 4.46% 4.75% 4.81% 4.93% 5.35% 6.40% 7.39%
5 4.47% 4.83% 4.89% 4.99% 5.39% 6.62% 7.54%
7 4.52% 4.93% 5.00% 5.11% 5.56% 6.91% 7.73%
8 4.60% 4.99% 5.05% 5.18% 5.64% 7.05% 7.79%
9 4.63% 5.04% 5.11% 5.24% 5.72% 7.11% 7.78%
10 4.69% 5.11% 5.17% 5.30% 5.83% 7.23% 7.77%
15 4.85% 5.37% 5.40% 5.58% 6.10% 7.39% 8.08%
20 4.86% 5.47% 5.51% 5.68% 6.21% 7.40% 8.04%
25 4.79% 5.43% 5.52% 5.69% 6.20% 7.33% 8.00%
30 4.66% 5.30% 5.54% 5.70% 6.25% 7.34% 8.03%  
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Table VII.  Default probabilities estimated by Option Theory (EDF) 
Company Stock  DPT Equity Equity ke Asset  Asset EDF EDF
price December Volatility Beta December Value Volatility 1 year 1 ano
December 2004 2004 December December best worst
2004 2004 2004 ke 0%
All America 15.6333 2.4818 N.A. 0.5327 13.18% N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Ambev 1.3505 0.1030 31.4181% 0.4169 12.33% 1.4444 29.3758% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Aracruz Celulose S.A. 10.1200 2.3100 38.7239% 0.2698 11.25% 12.2257 32.0542% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Banco Bradesco S.A. 64.0807 N.A. 39.7834% 0.8592 15.57% N.A. N.A.
Banco Itau S.A. 395.6351 N.A. 38.0786% 0.9278 16.07% N.A. N.A.
Brasil Telecom S.A. 0.0133 N.A. 41.7518% 1.0519 16.99% N.A. N.A.
Braskem S.A. 0.1317 0.0430 56.9883% 1.0699 17.12% 0.1739 43.1815% 0.0316% 0.1258%
Cia Energética de Minas Gerais - CEMIG 0.0646 0.0174 40.3394% 1.0133 16.70% 0.0805 32.3967% 0.0000% 0.0002%
Centrais Elétricas Paulista - CESP 0.0130 0.0676 62.2616% 1.0843 17.22% 0.0744 11.3109% 1.0287% 21.3893%
Cia Paranaense de Energia - COPEL 0.0116 N.A. 41.4030% 1.0016 16.62% N.A. N.A.
Cia Siderurgica Nacional - CSN 50.7900 18.4948 45.4986% 1.0502 16.97% 67.6490 34.1602% 0.0019% 0.0144%
Cia Siderúrgica Paulista - Cosipa 1.1837 0.4761 61.5871% 0.9676 16.37% 1.6176 45.1071% 0.2196% 0.6464%
Eletrobrás 0.0392 N.A. 50.1085% 1.0287 16.82% N.A. N.A.
Embratel S.A. 0.0050 0.0083 75.5797% 1.5737 20.81% 0.0125 31.4218% 3.5882% 12.7520%
Centrais Elétricas do Espírito Santo - Escelsa 83.0000 281.7664 68.1440% 1.0000 16.60% 338.5707 17.5531% 2.8423% 16.8901%
Gerdau S.A. 46.4939 14.1431 45.9657% 1.0531 16.99% 59.3861 35.9871% 0.0009% 0.0070%
Cia. Brasileira de Petróleo Ipiranga 26.9493 4.7782 41.4780% 0.5760 13.49% 31.3050 35.7070% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Klabin S.A. 5.4000 1.1049 39.3779% 0.5372 13.21% 6.4072 33.1878% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Net Serviços de Comunicação S.A. 0.4287 0.7735 85.1596% 1.7362 22.01% 1.1206 34.9007% 6.4482% 18.7370%
Petrobrás S.A. 97.1500 19.4757 33.6832% 0.7845 15.02% 114.9033 28.4789% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Sadia S.A. 5.8305 3.1734 37.2069% 0.7583 14.83% 8.7233 24.8688% 0.0003% 0.0040%
Unibanco S.A. 9.0000 N.A. 22.8774% 0.1805 10.59% N.A. N.A.
Usiminas 51.3817 14.1862 54.5582% 1.3677 19.30% 64.3128 43.5905% 0.0111% 0.0578%
Cia Vale do Rio Doce 64.1500 6.5681 33.0168% 0.3461 11.81% 70.1372 30.1983% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Votorantim S.A. 43.3000 9.6034 36.4142% 0.3649 11.94% 52.0540 30.2904% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
Table VIII.  Ratings graded by S&P and Moody’s versus ratings assigned based on EDF 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Company S&P Moody's Assigned credit rating based on Assigned credit rating based on
Brazil Domestic EDF (S&P) EDF (Moody's)
Currency best scenario worst scenario best scenario worst scenario
Ambev AAA Baa3 AAA AAA Aaa Aaa
Aracruz Celulose S.A. AAA Baa3 AAA AAA Aaa Aaa
Braskem S.A. AA- AA BBB Aa Baa
Cia Energética de Minas Gerais - CEMIG B1 AAA AAA Aaa Aaa
Centrais Elétricas Paulista - CESP CCC BB CCC Ba Caa
Cia Siderurgica Nacional - CSN AA- AA A Aa A
Cia Siderúrgica Paulista - Cosipa A+ BBB BB BBB Ba
Embratel S.A. B1 B B B B
Centrais Elétricas do Espírito Santo - Escelsa BB CCC Ba CCC
Gerdau S.A. AA- AA AA Aa Aa
Cia. Brasileira de Petróleo Ipiranga AAA AAA Aaa Aaa
Klabin S.A. AA- AAA AAA Aaa Aaa
Net Serviços de Comunicação S.A. D Ca B CCC B Caa
Petrobrás S.A. BBB+ Baa1 AAA AAA Aaa Aaa
Sadia S.A. AA AA Aa Aa
Usiminas A+ AA AA Aa Aa
Cia Vale do Rio Doce Baa2 AAA AAA Aaa Aa
Votorantim S.A. AAA AAA AAA Aaa Aaa  
 